Image may be NSFW.
Clik here to view.
(၂၀၁၃ ခုႏွစ္ တပ္မေတာ္(ေရ) ႏွစ္လည္မဂၢဇင္း တြင္ ေဖာ္ျပထားသည့္ ဘဘ Lieut.BN (rtd.) Kyaw Thein Lwin ေရးသားေသာ ေဆာင္းပါး)
A study of the actual overall situation during transition from Burma R.N.V.R to the regular BURMA NAVY ( 1944 -1952)
NAVY´s MOST IMPORTANT SHIP
What would you say, if I were to ask you a question - ¨ Which ship, in your opinion was the most important ship in our Navy that made maximum contribution for our newly Independent Country to prevail during those critical years after our Independence when the political situation was highly unstable and perilously precarious, and the Union Government almost fell due to insurrection ? ¨
Your answer, and those of the majority, I expect, would be ¨ U.B.S.¨ MAYU" ,- which was a River class frigate named H.M.S.¨ FAL¨ built in 1942 and was taken over from the Royal Navy in May 1947 by Burma R.N,V,R a few months prior to Independence. She became the flag ship of the new budding Navy of Union of Myanmar.
Restpectfully, but candidly, my opinion would have to differ, based on my service in the Navy in a senior staff position during those years. My answer would not be the MAYU although she was also, no doubt, very important as the flagship of our Fleet , and our only major war vessel. She also made valuable operational contributions in support of the Tatmadaw for the Battle for Insein, and re-occupation of Bassein ( Pathein ) and other Army operations around Moulmein
( Mawlamyaing) as well as in the Arakan ( Rakkhine ) coast.
My answer, which may surprise most of you would be, not one but four ships of the same class , UBS ¨ INLAY¨, ¨INMA¨,¨ INYA¨, and ¨INDAW¨. These four ships , which were originally built as World War II Landing craft ( Gun) had to be procured with much difficulty, re-armed and commissioned just in time to save the Day during Country’s critical times. The Union Government was then, singly fighting for its survival and warding off various attempts which were being made by a motley of insurgents and endeavouring to establish and maintain law and order, when most areas in the Delta and inland waterways were under control of various multi-coloured and armed insurgent groups.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: (1944-1952)
Before World War II ended, and soon after the reoccupation of Yangon city in year 1945, the M.L flotilla of Burma R.N.V.R which consisted of six well-armed Fairmile type 112ft. boats, were augmented by fourteen other Fairmiles and eight smaller 70ft. H.D. M.Ls of the Royal Navy Coastal Forces after being decommissioned at the end of hostilities. Simultaneously, overall responsibility for all naval operations in Myanmar waters was passed on from the British Far Eastern Fleet, Arakan Coastal Forces of the Royal Navy, to the Burma R.N.V.R. , which was then only a small wartime volunteer force consisting of people from all over the Union. At that time the Royal Navy also handed over two Canadian built Motor Minesweepers, MMS "197 "and ¨201¨, so that the uncompleted task of clearing still active mines in Dawei and Mawlamyaing rivers could be completely swept and made safe for navigation of commercial craft and general shipping.
The Fairmile MLs, with their superior armament , speed, and shallow draft were operationally ideal for riverine operations as already proven during actions against the retreating Japanese forces as the war ended .However, their drawbacks were two fold - they were powered by uneconomical, high speed octane engines which were not suitable nor economical except during wartime, and their leaking wooden hulls had become unfit and unseaworthy for further service. Therefore, all Fairmiles had to be decommissioned and scrapped and their armament were brought ashore to U.B.S "Ratanabon¨, the Navy barracks and shore training establishment, first located temporarily at St. Paul´s school building in downtown Yangon, and later moved to current location at Monkey Point.
Thus, during early months of the year of Independence in 1948, our new Navy found itself completely lacking in riverine fighting craft except for the slow and aging 70 ft diesel powered, poorly armed, H.D.M.Ls whose wooden hulls also needed to be scrapped. Three of these M.L.s had to be permanently stationed in the Arakan to support Army operations against armed Mujahids and Communist insurgents. Remaining five were based in Yangon . In turn they regularly patrolled in the Delta, where most of the area had come under control of Insurgents and the entire flotilla was very much overworked in support of the Army .The larger fighting ship, the MAYU and the two Motor Minesweepers were purely meant for seagoing and coastal operations due to their size and draft and could not operate in the delta and riverine areas.
Locally, only the Government Dockyard at Dawbon had previous experience in building navy M.Ls before the War. It would take a few years to construct suitably designed new naval craft. As an alternative the British Government was first approached to spare some armed river-worthy craft but the Royal Navy itself had decommissioned their coastal forces vessels when the war ended and had no suitable craft available. Just before the Mayu was taken over, an old Yangtse China River monitor which had seen service in the two World Wars, H.M.S. ¨Scarab¨ was loaned to Burma R.N.V.R for a year in 1946 and was employed as a Mother ship for the new landing craft (personnel) Flotilla for patrolling along the Irrawaddy, but she also had limitations in size for navigating through smaller rivers and chaungs in the Delta. Nevertheless it gave our Navy Engineers who were mostly only experienced in internal combustion high speed engines, their first real experience in steam propulsion, in time to man the frigate MAYU later.
The true situation at that time was that it would therefore only be possible to obtain suitable naval crafts by specially design and ordered to suit our operational specifications by procuring from overseas shipyards . But this would, not only take a few years to complete but also put a heavy strain on the Country’s limited foreign exchange reserves adversely affected due to grave insurgency and internal security problems reducing our much precious export earnings. Perhaps, the British Government, at that juncture, was also reluctant to increase their cooperation as Myanmar had chosen to leave the Commonwealth after gaining her Independence.
MOST URGENTLY NEEDED ARMED INLAND RIVER CRAFT.
In the year 1947, during preparation for Independence , the War Office was established to jointly locate the Ministry of Defence and the three offices of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Defence Forces with the main object to achieve better coordination.. The Navy General Staff then consisted of Chief of Naval Staff ( C.N.S.) , and Deputy Chief . as Maintenance Commander, assisted by Staff Officer Operations & Intelligence, ( S.O.O. + S.O. I ) and Staff Officer Communications ( S.C.O ) and a Captain´s Secretary. Commander Kin Maung Bo was chosen as first Commanding Officer of Burma Navy , after relinquishing command of the MAYU and position as Senior Officer Afloat ( S.O.A.). He was nominated first as Chief of Naval Staff and later re-designated as Vice-Chief of Defence Services ( Navy ). Commander Bo, under whom I was serving on the MAYU when the ship was taken over from the Royal Navy, chose me to succeed him as S.O.O. & I at the new War Office. This was to be my first shore assignment for which I had no previous experience nor inclination after four years of continuous and happy afloat service in all types of naval craft . But in the Navy one has to learn to accept orders.
The main responsibility to build up our Navy to a proper maritime fighting force and to secure inland waterways rested solely upon the newly appointed Chief of Naval Staff. Fortunately the Government had rightly chosen as C..N.S., Commander Kin Maung Bo, who had proven himself as a most competent and experienced professional after having commanded Fairmiles in action during WW II and later as our first Commanding Officer of the MAYU. Although untried yet in this important top command position, he was a talented deep thinker and an capable strategist. He fully realised that the problem of acquiring more naval craft demanded top priority .
While Navy´s primary role was to coordinate and support the Army operations, we also found that there was another equally important function for the new Navy to bear a greater responsibility to the Government . It was in accordance with the universal general naval doctrine ¨ to keep the sea lanes open and prevent blockade in times of crisis.” The Country´s financial lifeline , in the case of our one year old Union then, depended entirely on the uninterrupted flow of rice and timber exports , and crude oil shipments in barges from up Country most of which were routed along the Irrawaddy and the delta region and finally channelled through the Twantay canal route , a strategic choke point to the Capital , to be shipped out overseas from the main seaport of Yangon. Unlike the present days, there were no highways and bridges linking Yangon with the Delta areas and this was the only route..
MAKE- SHIFT MEN-OF-WAR
During the second half of year 1948, Government forces had lost full control of internal security of the Delta , and in Twantay area in particular, owing to lack of reliable Government troops and increase of anti-Government insurgent activities, it was decided therefore to accept the offer from the K.N.D.O forces ( before the organisation was outlawed in January 1949 ) occupy the area in order to keep the communist and other insurgents out of the approaches to Yangon. However, this situation abruptly changed as soon as K.N.D.O s took up arms against the Union in uprising at Insein .Twantay canal which was fully controlled by them became totally unsafe for navigation by barges loaded with rice and oil barges from Chauk and teak timber rafts for export proceeding to Yangon without naval escort. These slow steaming commercial convoys under inadequate naval escort came under frequent attacks by K.N.D.Os from both sides of the canal resulting in many heavy naval and civilian casualties . The twenty one mile passage through the canal became known as “ hellfire passage” . In consequence, the Country´s vulnerable export shipment programme was drastically reduced and our foreign exchange balances became critically low. The Navy very much needed well armed and armoured inland fighting craft which could not only withstand onslaught by the Insurgents who possessed heavier calibre guns and had occupied strategic areas but to be able to take the offensive to alleviate this situation.
Each morning, as Representative of C.N.S office, I attended the joint services coordination meeting presided by the Army G.S.O (1) in my position as Navy’s S.O.O.. The discussions were mainly regarding security operations in the whole Country which had become an urgent and serious issue requiring immediate and coordinated action by all three armed services . The main role for the Navy was to provide armed escort craft to Army river transports and provide security in riverine towns to support the Army garrisons . Each day situation was becoming critical as, in addition to Communists and PVO groups, well armed K.N.D.O insurgents who were better organised have become very active in Delta region. Government forces, much depleted in strength due to desertions and mutinies, lacked high calibre fire power and their light weapons were inadequate against better armed and experienced insurgents. It became very obvious that the Navy lacked adequate fighting craft and needed armed fighting craft to be able to effectively play its role as an important arm of our Defence services. An immediate and urgent action was called for to rectify this dificient state of affairs.
After serious considerations by C.N,S, I was deputised by him to investigate and requisition some most suitable inland commercial craft from the Scottish owned Irrawaddy Flotilla Co. which had just been nationalised as the Government managed the Inland Water Transport Board ( I.W.T.B.) and to fit out with armament previously removed from decommissioned Fairmiles for conversion to armed River Gunboats ( R.G.B ) as soon as possible. Out of the available I.W.T craft, we chose three steel hull S type double deckers as most suitable type for our purpose due to their light draft and capacity to accommodate troops. These craft were installed with four 20mm twin Oerlikon cannons in the lower deck, two pairs on each side . Living spaces on the upper deck were allocated to our newly formed ´naval landing party ´, which was unofficially created as our ¨ Marines". The three R.G.B.s were named ¨SHWEPAZUN¨;¨ SABAN¨, and ¨SABAY¨ each commanded by a senior Lieutenant. They later proved to be the mainstay of our inland fleet and were able to carry out successful operations in the Delta and on the Irrawaddy against K.N.D.O and other insurgents but only as a temporary stop gap until better long term solution could be found. It was also found that they could also act independently when needed to attack, land and occupy insurgent occupied areas, villages or small town with its own trained Naval Landing Party marines before the assigned Army units could arrive to take over, and boost the morale of the public.
However , these ex-I.W.T double decker R.G.Bs had a design weakness for providing longer range covering fire due to their low deck height and the siting of the twin-20 mm cannon
main armament which could not elevate high enough on the lower deck. Therefore, it was also planned to acquire two shallow draft B type river tugboats, and mount a 40 mm BOFORS gun on the aft deck space and a 20 mm single Oerlikon on the foredeck , and, converted as supporting gunships, into a well armed and formidable naval support craft next only to the frigate MAYU in fire power. Unfortunately, in September 1949, after successful completion of gun trials , a group of communist minded and misguided naval mutineers together with their communist associates, hijacked these two boats, the B2 and B4 from Theinbyu base jetty and proceeded up the Pegu river under their control to join the Insurgents. As these armed tugboats would become too dangerous and a possible menace to the MAYU in the hands of the insurgents, the Air Force had to sink these two craft by strafing and bombing off Kayan creek, under express orders from War Office.
Thus, during the early months of our Independence, we had only temporarily solved the urgent and pressing need for more fighting craft by converting and arming requisitioned three inland commercial vessels but the Navy still needed to plan and acquire proper naval craft suitable for inland and coastal region and also replace the aging H.D.M.Ls on a permanent long term basis.
Image may be NSFW.
Clik here to view.![]()
THE BIRTH OF LANDING CRAFT GUNS ( U.B.S. ¨ INLAY¨, ¨INYA¨, ¨INMA¨ & ¨INDAW¨ )
One day in February 1949 while the battle for Insein was still in progress, Commander Bo called me to his Office for a conference. His deputy, Commander Than Pe was also present.
The C.N.S. explained the current situation and our imperative need to obtain suitable fighting craft from overseas but we were not able to get any assistance from the British Government as their coastal forces had been disbanded and scrapped. There was also no possibility of acquiring craft from neighbouring Countries either. He further explained that the only possibility might be to search from UK scrap shipyards for some suitable decommissioned landing crafts which had become surplus after World War II , procure the hulls and engines and arm them locally. He then gave me a copy of the recent Jane’s Fighting Ships, an unofficial publication of all the World Navies warships, which he had borrowed from the British Naval Adviser and asked me to study it carefully, make a proper research and recommend the type of landing craft which would be most suitable as gunships. We would then seek for availability overseas for surplus and decommissioned craft through our diplomatic channels.
It was an interesting and a challenging assignment for me to find a good solution. Basically, I was only familiar with wartime built landing crafts which were generally in three categories, smaller landing craft personnel ( LCPs) and landing craft mechanised (LCMs) which are too small , Landing craft Tank ( LCTs) which are of medium size but with flat bow ramps and are too slow, and finally Landing Ship tank ( LSTs) size and draft of too large for inland. Our basic requirements were craft around 150 ft- 160 ft in length and draft not more than seven feet and of moderate speed but preferably well armoured with proper seaworthy ships bow and to be suitable for coastal voyages as well. At first I could not find any landing craft type with specifications which came near ours and was almost about to give up. The U.S. Navy landng crafts were also of similar designs. Then , by a stroke of luck, I stumbled upon the British Navy’s two specially designed types of armed landing crafts primarily intended as close inshore support ships for WWII Normandy D day landings to neutralise German shore batteries close inshore. One was called Landing Craft Flak ( LCF) to be mounted with 300 rockets , but not quite suitable for us. The other type was called Landing Craft Guns ( LCG ) M for medium and L for large. I found that the LCG (M) type was closest to our needs. Its general specifications were
Displacement : 380 ts
Dimensions: 154.5 ft x 22.3 ft x 6 ft. 11 in.
Machinery : 2-shaft Paxman diesel 1000 HP - 11.75 knots. Fuel 9780 gals
Bridge & engine room : Two inch armour plating
Designed Armament : 2 x 25 pdr Mk II field gun in 4 inch armoured naval turrets
, 2 x 20 mm Oerlikon
Complement : 31
When I made my report to C.N.S, he fully agreed with me of my choice and immediately contacted our first Military Attache in the UK, Major General Tun Hla Oung to enquire about availability of any surplus or scrapped LCG Ms. After about a week, we received the unexpected good news that there were infact four LCG M Mark II version hulls complete with engines, generators and auxiliaries but with armament removed, which were available through a scrap dealer on “ as is “ basis at a very reasonable cost and lying at John Brown Shipyard in Scotland at. They were numbered 513, 514,516,and 517. We considered It was too good to be true and not a chance to be missed. After receiving a favourable pre-purchase survey condition report arranged by the Military attache that the four hulls were little used previously and in very good condition, we obtained the approval for purchase and delivery under tow to Yangon, from our Ministry of Defence and these four crafts were purchased initially without armament. It did not matter. We had a lot of ex- Fairmile surplus six pounders, Bofors and Oerlikons lying at the barracks . Just needed to bring these crafts to our waters.
In April, 1949 I was sent with the second batch of Lieutenants to the UK, since I missed out to be with the first batch as I was temporarily under Insurgents captivity, to undergo a series of technical courses at various Royal Navy Establishments. Commander Bo had informed our Military Attache in London ( who did not have an Assistant Naval Attache then ) that he could make use of my services unofficially whenever needed for this project. The Navy also sent Lieut (E) Kyaw Maung for familiarisation with the machinery and coordination with the towing company and taking passage back.
During my first visit to inspect the four crafts at Gourock in Scotland, I discovered from the Shipyard that these crafts were being fitted out to be each mounted with two 25 pdr Army guns enclosed in 4 “ armoured naval turrets while under construction but were later removed after Normandy landings and the Guns were still lying at the Shipyard. When I asked if the guns could be purchased, the Yard told me that we would need permission from the British Ministry of Defence. I reported this to our C.N.S and the Military Attache ,Major General Tun Hla Oung , (who was an ex-Sandhurst graduate). Due to his strong personality and excellent relationship with his Sandhurst colleagues which included Field Marshal Sir William Slim, the necessary approval was obtained . We were just only able to hastily instal the 25 pdr guns before the four crafts sailed under tow by two tugs on their two month long voyage to Myanmar.
Immediately after these long awaited ships arrived, our Base Engineering (B.E.O.) Staff at the Pazundaung Naval Dockyard gave top priority and worked around the clock to completely refit the four eagerly awaited “new” Gunships and installed two 20mm Oerlikons to each ship to supplement the two mounted forward 25 pdrs. They were already designated to be Navy’s lake class major war vessels in addition to the MAYU and named, the INLAY, INYA, INMA & INDAW. The first ship under the command of veteran C.O , Lieut.Commander Maung Yaw who had led the S class R.G.B flotilla , was also to be Senior Officer of the LCG Flotilla. On its first patrol through Twantay canal cool headed Bo Hmu Yaw intentionally anchored overnight in the canal midstream, inviting the Insurgents to ambush as they had been previously attacking passing crafts at will. But they found that they could do no damage to the ship due to its thick armour plated gun turrets ,and well protected bridge and engine room. The shots they fired at the guns just bounced off the turrets. The ship carefully noted the insurgent positions, after they had spotted them. Next morning the ship opened up her powerful artillery and completely silenced them. For the first time , the Navy was calling the shots and taking the offensive. After a few salvoes towards insurgent positions with ship’s 25 pounders , it must have completely surprised and demoralised them and there were no more return fire from the enemy nor sneaky ambushes The new LCGs had become a terror to them and Lord of the waterways. It was not long before the Navy could regularly organise convoys of rice and teak laden barges as well as oil barges escorted by an HDML or an RGB leading , and an LCG following in the rear. The commercial convoys were no longer molested by insurgents and much needed regular unrestricted commercial shipping traffic through Twantay canal continued in their unhindered safe passage. Our Country was again able to resume its most essential export and trading commitments and to supplement its dwindling foreign exchange reserves which depended upon regular export earnings.
News travelled fast in Insurgents network whether it were the Communists, underground anti-Government P.V.O s or K.N. D.Os. At last, the Navy now had four powerful inland fighting craft the U.B.S. “ Inlay” “ Inya “ “ Inma “ and “ Indaw “, armed with heavy calibre 25 pdr. artillery guns and the ships themselves were well protected by thick armour plating . The Insurgents realised it would be safer for them if they did not hang around when these ships were patrolling in the vicinity, and to give them a wide berth to keep out of harm’s way.
By the end of year 1949 , these ships became a strong deterrent to anti-Government armed groups and effectively contributed towards the success of our Government forces operational achievements to regain control of internal security and proper administration in in the Delta riverine areas , Rakkhine and Taninthayi coastal regions. The Union of Myanmar was at last, again out of immediate danger from complete collapse. Our Government Armed Forces were in a position to consolidate, reorganise and take full initiative in counter-insurgency campaigns which followed gradually and successfully, and the tide had turned to our favour.
Perhaps , the important role played by these four ships and Navy personnel of all ranks who manned them and those who helped to refit them , were not fully recorded and have escaped notice to most of us. However, the British owned Bombay Burmah Trading Company Ltd. ( BBTCL), which had monopolised our rice and teak exports for years before it was nationalised, did not forget the Navy’s role in keeping the Twantay canal hellfire passage open for their much needed commercial traffic. In recognition and gratitude, they presented to the Navy Wardroom Mess a rare twenty foot long dining table which was made from a single teak tree all in one piece, and appropriately inscribed with a plaque containing their brief citation. The writer is not sure where this historic mess table is located now but if the reader should find himself dining on this table which may now be in one of our Navy’s establishment, please look for the inscription and remember the good work done by your older Navy brothers over sixty years ago to keep the Ensign flying and to establish the highest traditions of our Tatmadaw’s Navy. It is also important to remember that Navy’s role is not only to safeguard our seas and waterways, and maintain internal security as a team member of the Defence Services, but also to support the Nation’s economy in times of need in keeping the the trading routes open.
(Contributed by Lieut.BN (rtd.) Kyaw Thein Lwin) .
Clik here to view.
(၂၀၁၃ ခုႏွစ္ တပ္မေတာ္(ေရ) ႏွစ္လည္မဂၢဇင္း တြင္ ေဖာ္ျပထားသည့္ ဘဘ Lieut.BN (rtd.) Kyaw Thein Lwin ေရးသားေသာ ေဆာင္းပါး)
A study of the actual overall situation during transition from Burma R.N.V.R to the regular BURMA NAVY ( 1944 -1952)
NAVY´s MOST IMPORTANT SHIP
What would you say, if I were to ask you a question - ¨ Which ship, in your opinion was the most important ship in our Navy that made maximum contribution for our newly Independent Country to prevail during those critical years after our Independence when the political situation was highly unstable and perilously precarious, and the Union Government almost fell due to insurrection ? ¨
Your answer, and those of the majority, I expect, would be ¨ U.B.S.¨ MAYU" ,- which was a River class frigate named H.M.S.¨ FAL¨ built in 1942 and was taken over from the Royal Navy in May 1947 by Burma R.N,V,R a few months prior to Independence. She became the flag ship of the new budding Navy of Union of Myanmar.
Restpectfully, but candidly, my opinion would have to differ, based on my service in the Navy in a senior staff position during those years. My answer would not be the MAYU although she was also, no doubt, very important as the flagship of our Fleet , and our only major war vessel. She also made valuable operational contributions in support of the Tatmadaw for the Battle for Insein, and re-occupation of Bassein ( Pathein ) and other Army operations around Moulmein
( Mawlamyaing) as well as in the Arakan ( Rakkhine ) coast.
My answer, which may surprise most of you would be, not one but four ships of the same class , UBS ¨ INLAY¨, ¨INMA¨,¨ INYA¨, and ¨INDAW¨. These four ships , which were originally built as World War II Landing craft ( Gun) had to be procured with much difficulty, re-armed and commissioned just in time to save the Day during Country’s critical times. The Union Government was then, singly fighting for its survival and warding off various attempts which were being made by a motley of insurgents and endeavouring to establish and maintain law and order, when most areas in the Delta and inland waterways were under control of various multi-coloured and armed insurgent groups.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: (1944-1952)
Before World War II ended, and soon after the reoccupation of Yangon city in year 1945, the M.L flotilla of Burma R.N.V.R which consisted of six well-armed Fairmile type 112ft. boats, were augmented by fourteen other Fairmiles and eight smaller 70ft. H.D. M.Ls of the Royal Navy Coastal Forces after being decommissioned at the end of hostilities. Simultaneously, overall responsibility for all naval operations in Myanmar waters was passed on from the British Far Eastern Fleet, Arakan Coastal Forces of the Royal Navy, to the Burma R.N.V.R. , which was then only a small wartime volunteer force consisting of people from all over the Union. At that time the Royal Navy also handed over two Canadian built Motor Minesweepers, MMS "197 "and ¨201¨, so that the uncompleted task of clearing still active mines in Dawei and Mawlamyaing rivers could be completely swept and made safe for navigation of commercial craft and general shipping.
The Fairmile MLs, with their superior armament , speed, and shallow draft were operationally ideal for riverine operations as already proven during actions against the retreating Japanese forces as the war ended .However, their drawbacks were two fold - they were powered by uneconomical, high speed octane engines which were not suitable nor economical except during wartime, and their leaking wooden hulls had become unfit and unseaworthy for further service. Therefore, all Fairmiles had to be decommissioned and scrapped and their armament were brought ashore to U.B.S "Ratanabon¨, the Navy barracks and shore training establishment, first located temporarily at St. Paul´s school building in downtown Yangon, and later moved to current location at Monkey Point.
Thus, during early months of the year of Independence in 1948, our new Navy found itself completely lacking in riverine fighting craft except for the slow and aging 70 ft diesel powered, poorly armed, H.D.M.Ls whose wooden hulls also needed to be scrapped. Three of these M.L.s had to be permanently stationed in the Arakan to support Army operations against armed Mujahids and Communist insurgents. Remaining five were based in Yangon . In turn they regularly patrolled in the Delta, where most of the area had come under control of Insurgents and the entire flotilla was very much overworked in support of the Army .The larger fighting ship, the MAYU and the two Motor Minesweepers were purely meant for seagoing and coastal operations due to their size and draft and could not operate in the delta and riverine areas.
Locally, only the Government Dockyard at Dawbon had previous experience in building navy M.Ls before the War. It would take a few years to construct suitably designed new naval craft. As an alternative the British Government was first approached to spare some armed river-worthy craft but the Royal Navy itself had decommissioned their coastal forces vessels when the war ended and had no suitable craft available. Just before the Mayu was taken over, an old Yangtse China River monitor which had seen service in the two World Wars, H.M.S. ¨Scarab¨ was loaned to Burma R.N.V.R for a year in 1946 and was employed as a Mother ship for the new landing craft (personnel) Flotilla for patrolling along the Irrawaddy, but she also had limitations in size for navigating through smaller rivers and chaungs in the Delta. Nevertheless it gave our Navy Engineers who were mostly only experienced in internal combustion high speed engines, their first real experience in steam propulsion, in time to man the frigate MAYU later.
The true situation at that time was that it would therefore only be possible to obtain suitable naval crafts by specially design and ordered to suit our operational specifications by procuring from overseas shipyards . But this would, not only take a few years to complete but also put a heavy strain on the Country’s limited foreign exchange reserves adversely affected due to grave insurgency and internal security problems reducing our much precious export earnings. Perhaps, the British Government, at that juncture, was also reluctant to increase their cooperation as Myanmar had chosen to leave the Commonwealth after gaining her Independence.
MOST URGENTLY NEEDED ARMED INLAND RIVER CRAFT.
In the year 1947, during preparation for Independence , the War Office was established to jointly locate the Ministry of Defence and the three offices of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Defence Forces with the main object to achieve better coordination.. The Navy General Staff then consisted of Chief of Naval Staff ( C.N.S.) , and Deputy Chief . as Maintenance Commander, assisted by Staff Officer Operations & Intelligence, ( S.O.O. + S.O. I ) and Staff Officer Communications ( S.C.O ) and a Captain´s Secretary. Commander Kin Maung Bo was chosen as first Commanding Officer of Burma Navy , after relinquishing command of the MAYU and position as Senior Officer Afloat ( S.O.A.). He was nominated first as Chief of Naval Staff and later re-designated as Vice-Chief of Defence Services ( Navy ). Commander Bo, under whom I was serving on the MAYU when the ship was taken over from the Royal Navy, chose me to succeed him as S.O.O. & I at the new War Office. This was to be my first shore assignment for which I had no previous experience nor inclination after four years of continuous and happy afloat service in all types of naval craft . But in the Navy one has to learn to accept orders.
The main responsibility to build up our Navy to a proper maritime fighting force and to secure inland waterways rested solely upon the newly appointed Chief of Naval Staff. Fortunately the Government had rightly chosen as C..N.S., Commander Kin Maung Bo, who had proven himself as a most competent and experienced professional after having commanded Fairmiles in action during WW II and later as our first Commanding Officer of the MAYU. Although untried yet in this important top command position, he was a talented deep thinker and an capable strategist. He fully realised that the problem of acquiring more naval craft demanded top priority .
While Navy´s primary role was to coordinate and support the Army operations, we also found that there was another equally important function for the new Navy to bear a greater responsibility to the Government . It was in accordance with the universal general naval doctrine ¨ to keep the sea lanes open and prevent blockade in times of crisis.” The Country´s financial lifeline , in the case of our one year old Union then, depended entirely on the uninterrupted flow of rice and timber exports , and crude oil shipments in barges from up Country most of which were routed along the Irrawaddy and the delta region and finally channelled through the Twantay canal route , a strategic choke point to the Capital , to be shipped out overseas from the main seaport of Yangon. Unlike the present days, there were no highways and bridges linking Yangon with the Delta areas and this was the only route..
MAKE- SHIFT MEN-OF-WAR
During the second half of year 1948, Government forces had lost full control of internal security of the Delta , and in Twantay area in particular, owing to lack of reliable Government troops and increase of anti-Government insurgent activities, it was decided therefore to accept the offer from the K.N.D.O forces ( before the organisation was outlawed in January 1949 ) occupy the area in order to keep the communist and other insurgents out of the approaches to Yangon. However, this situation abruptly changed as soon as K.N.D.O s took up arms against the Union in uprising at Insein .Twantay canal which was fully controlled by them became totally unsafe for navigation by barges loaded with rice and oil barges from Chauk and teak timber rafts for export proceeding to Yangon without naval escort. These slow steaming commercial convoys under inadequate naval escort came under frequent attacks by K.N.D.Os from both sides of the canal resulting in many heavy naval and civilian casualties . The twenty one mile passage through the canal became known as “ hellfire passage” . In consequence, the Country´s vulnerable export shipment programme was drastically reduced and our foreign exchange balances became critically low. The Navy very much needed well armed and armoured inland fighting craft which could not only withstand onslaught by the Insurgents who possessed heavier calibre guns and had occupied strategic areas but to be able to take the offensive to alleviate this situation.
Each morning, as Representative of C.N.S office, I attended the joint services coordination meeting presided by the Army G.S.O (1) in my position as Navy’s S.O.O.. The discussions were mainly regarding security operations in the whole Country which had become an urgent and serious issue requiring immediate and coordinated action by all three armed services . The main role for the Navy was to provide armed escort craft to Army river transports and provide security in riverine towns to support the Army garrisons . Each day situation was becoming critical as, in addition to Communists and PVO groups, well armed K.N.D.O insurgents who were better organised have become very active in Delta region. Government forces, much depleted in strength due to desertions and mutinies, lacked high calibre fire power and their light weapons were inadequate against better armed and experienced insurgents. It became very obvious that the Navy lacked adequate fighting craft and needed armed fighting craft to be able to effectively play its role as an important arm of our Defence services. An immediate and urgent action was called for to rectify this dificient state of affairs.
After serious considerations by C.N,S, I was deputised by him to investigate and requisition some most suitable inland commercial craft from the Scottish owned Irrawaddy Flotilla Co. which had just been nationalised as the Government managed the Inland Water Transport Board ( I.W.T.B.) and to fit out with armament previously removed from decommissioned Fairmiles for conversion to armed River Gunboats ( R.G.B ) as soon as possible. Out of the available I.W.T craft, we chose three steel hull S type double deckers as most suitable type for our purpose due to their light draft and capacity to accommodate troops. These craft were installed with four 20mm twin Oerlikon cannons in the lower deck, two pairs on each side . Living spaces on the upper deck were allocated to our newly formed ´naval landing party ´, which was unofficially created as our ¨ Marines". The three R.G.B.s were named ¨SHWEPAZUN¨;¨ SABAN¨, and ¨SABAY¨ each commanded by a senior Lieutenant. They later proved to be the mainstay of our inland fleet and were able to carry out successful operations in the Delta and on the Irrawaddy against K.N.D.O and other insurgents but only as a temporary stop gap until better long term solution could be found. It was also found that they could also act independently when needed to attack, land and occupy insurgent occupied areas, villages or small town with its own trained Naval Landing Party marines before the assigned Army units could arrive to take over, and boost the morale of the public.
However , these ex-I.W.T double decker R.G.Bs had a design weakness for providing longer range covering fire due to their low deck height and the siting of the twin-20 mm cannon
main armament which could not elevate high enough on the lower deck. Therefore, it was also planned to acquire two shallow draft B type river tugboats, and mount a 40 mm BOFORS gun on the aft deck space and a 20 mm single Oerlikon on the foredeck , and, converted as supporting gunships, into a well armed and formidable naval support craft next only to the frigate MAYU in fire power. Unfortunately, in September 1949, after successful completion of gun trials , a group of communist minded and misguided naval mutineers together with their communist associates, hijacked these two boats, the B2 and B4 from Theinbyu base jetty and proceeded up the Pegu river under their control to join the Insurgents. As these armed tugboats would become too dangerous and a possible menace to the MAYU in the hands of the insurgents, the Air Force had to sink these two craft by strafing and bombing off Kayan creek, under express orders from War Office.
Thus, during the early months of our Independence, we had only temporarily solved the urgent and pressing need for more fighting craft by converting and arming requisitioned three inland commercial vessels but the Navy still needed to plan and acquire proper naval craft suitable for inland and coastal region and also replace the aging H.D.M.Ls on a permanent long term basis.
Image may be NSFW.
Clik here to view.
THE BIRTH OF LANDING CRAFT GUNS ( U.B.S. ¨ INLAY¨, ¨INYA¨, ¨INMA¨ & ¨INDAW¨ )
One day in February 1949 while the battle for Insein was still in progress, Commander Bo called me to his Office for a conference. His deputy, Commander Than Pe was also present.
The C.N.S. explained the current situation and our imperative need to obtain suitable fighting craft from overseas but we were not able to get any assistance from the British Government as their coastal forces had been disbanded and scrapped. There was also no possibility of acquiring craft from neighbouring Countries either. He further explained that the only possibility might be to search from UK scrap shipyards for some suitable decommissioned landing crafts which had become surplus after World War II , procure the hulls and engines and arm them locally. He then gave me a copy of the recent Jane’s Fighting Ships, an unofficial publication of all the World Navies warships, which he had borrowed from the British Naval Adviser and asked me to study it carefully, make a proper research and recommend the type of landing craft which would be most suitable as gunships. We would then seek for availability overseas for surplus and decommissioned craft through our diplomatic channels.
It was an interesting and a challenging assignment for me to find a good solution. Basically, I was only familiar with wartime built landing crafts which were generally in three categories, smaller landing craft personnel ( LCPs) and landing craft mechanised (LCMs) which are too small , Landing craft Tank ( LCTs) which are of medium size but with flat bow ramps and are too slow, and finally Landing Ship tank ( LSTs) size and draft of too large for inland. Our basic requirements were craft around 150 ft- 160 ft in length and draft not more than seven feet and of moderate speed but preferably well armoured with proper seaworthy ships bow and to be suitable for coastal voyages as well. At first I could not find any landing craft type with specifications which came near ours and was almost about to give up. The U.S. Navy landng crafts were also of similar designs. Then , by a stroke of luck, I stumbled upon the British Navy’s two specially designed types of armed landing crafts primarily intended as close inshore support ships for WWII Normandy D day landings to neutralise German shore batteries close inshore. One was called Landing Craft Flak ( LCF) to be mounted with 300 rockets , but not quite suitable for us. The other type was called Landing Craft Guns ( LCG ) M for medium and L for large. I found that the LCG (M) type was closest to our needs. Its general specifications were
Displacement : 380 ts
Dimensions: 154.5 ft x 22.3 ft x 6 ft. 11 in.
Machinery : 2-shaft Paxman diesel 1000 HP - 11.75 knots. Fuel 9780 gals
Bridge & engine room : Two inch armour plating
Designed Armament : 2 x 25 pdr Mk II field gun in 4 inch armoured naval turrets
, 2 x 20 mm Oerlikon
Complement : 31
When I made my report to C.N.S, he fully agreed with me of my choice and immediately contacted our first Military Attache in the UK, Major General Tun Hla Oung to enquire about availability of any surplus or scrapped LCG Ms. After about a week, we received the unexpected good news that there were infact four LCG M Mark II version hulls complete with engines, generators and auxiliaries but with armament removed, which were available through a scrap dealer on “ as is “ basis at a very reasonable cost and lying at John Brown Shipyard in Scotland at. They were numbered 513, 514,516,and 517. We considered It was too good to be true and not a chance to be missed. After receiving a favourable pre-purchase survey condition report arranged by the Military attache that the four hulls were little used previously and in very good condition, we obtained the approval for purchase and delivery under tow to Yangon, from our Ministry of Defence and these four crafts were purchased initially without armament. It did not matter. We had a lot of ex- Fairmile surplus six pounders, Bofors and Oerlikons lying at the barracks . Just needed to bring these crafts to our waters.
In April, 1949 I was sent with the second batch of Lieutenants to the UK, since I missed out to be with the first batch as I was temporarily under Insurgents captivity, to undergo a series of technical courses at various Royal Navy Establishments. Commander Bo had informed our Military Attache in London ( who did not have an Assistant Naval Attache then ) that he could make use of my services unofficially whenever needed for this project. The Navy also sent Lieut (E) Kyaw Maung for familiarisation with the machinery and coordination with the towing company and taking passage back.
During my first visit to inspect the four crafts at Gourock in Scotland, I discovered from the Shipyard that these crafts were being fitted out to be each mounted with two 25 pdr Army guns enclosed in 4 “ armoured naval turrets while under construction but were later removed after Normandy landings and the Guns were still lying at the Shipyard. When I asked if the guns could be purchased, the Yard told me that we would need permission from the British Ministry of Defence. I reported this to our C.N.S and the Military Attache ,Major General Tun Hla Oung , (who was an ex-Sandhurst graduate). Due to his strong personality and excellent relationship with his Sandhurst colleagues which included Field Marshal Sir William Slim, the necessary approval was obtained . We were just only able to hastily instal the 25 pdr guns before the four crafts sailed under tow by two tugs on their two month long voyage to Myanmar.
Immediately after these long awaited ships arrived, our Base Engineering (B.E.O.) Staff at the Pazundaung Naval Dockyard gave top priority and worked around the clock to completely refit the four eagerly awaited “new” Gunships and installed two 20mm Oerlikons to each ship to supplement the two mounted forward 25 pdrs. They were already designated to be Navy’s lake class major war vessels in addition to the MAYU and named, the INLAY, INYA, INMA & INDAW. The first ship under the command of veteran C.O , Lieut.Commander Maung Yaw who had led the S class R.G.B flotilla , was also to be Senior Officer of the LCG Flotilla. On its first patrol through Twantay canal cool headed Bo Hmu Yaw intentionally anchored overnight in the canal midstream, inviting the Insurgents to ambush as they had been previously attacking passing crafts at will. But they found that they could do no damage to the ship due to its thick armour plated gun turrets ,and well protected bridge and engine room. The shots they fired at the guns just bounced off the turrets. The ship carefully noted the insurgent positions, after they had spotted them. Next morning the ship opened up her powerful artillery and completely silenced them. For the first time , the Navy was calling the shots and taking the offensive. After a few salvoes towards insurgent positions with ship’s 25 pounders , it must have completely surprised and demoralised them and there were no more return fire from the enemy nor sneaky ambushes The new LCGs had become a terror to them and Lord of the waterways. It was not long before the Navy could regularly organise convoys of rice and teak laden barges as well as oil barges escorted by an HDML or an RGB leading , and an LCG following in the rear. The commercial convoys were no longer molested by insurgents and much needed regular unrestricted commercial shipping traffic through Twantay canal continued in their unhindered safe passage. Our Country was again able to resume its most essential export and trading commitments and to supplement its dwindling foreign exchange reserves which depended upon regular export earnings.
News travelled fast in Insurgents network whether it were the Communists, underground anti-Government P.V.O s or K.N. D.Os. At last, the Navy now had four powerful inland fighting craft the U.B.S. “ Inlay” “ Inya “ “ Inma “ and “ Indaw “, armed with heavy calibre 25 pdr. artillery guns and the ships themselves were well protected by thick armour plating . The Insurgents realised it would be safer for them if they did not hang around when these ships were patrolling in the vicinity, and to give them a wide berth to keep out of harm’s way.
By the end of year 1949 , these ships became a strong deterrent to anti-Government armed groups and effectively contributed towards the success of our Government forces operational achievements to regain control of internal security and proper administration in in the Delta riverine areas , Rakkhine and Taninthayi coastal regions. The Union of Myanmar was at last, again out of immediate danger from complete collapse. Our Government Armed Forces were in a position to consolidate, reorganise and take full initiative in counter-insurgency campaigns which followed gradually and successfully, and the tide had turned to our favour.
Perhaps , the important role played by these four ships and Navy personnel of all ranks who manned them and those who helped to refit them , were not fully recorded and have escaped notice to most of us. However, the British owned Bombay Burmah Trading Company Ltd. ( BBTCL), which had monopolised our rice and teak exports for years before it was nationalised, did not forget the Navy’s role in keeping the Twantay canal hellfire passage open for their much needed commercial traffic. In recognition and gratitude, they presented to the Navy Wardroom Mess a rare twenty foot long dining table which was made from a single teak tree all in one piece, and appropriately inscribed with a plaque containing their brief citation. The writer is not sure where this historic mess table is located now but if the reader should find himself dining on this table which may now be in one of our Navy’s establishment, please look for the inscription and remember the good work done by your older Navy brothers over sixty years ago to keep the Ensign flying and to establish the highest traditions of our Tatmadaw’s Navy. It is also important to remember that Navy’s role is not only to safeguard our seas and waterways, and maintain internal security as a team member of the Defence Services, but also to support the Nation’s economy in times of need in keeping the the trading routes open.
(Contributed by Lieut.BN (rtd.) Kyaw Thein Lwin) .